Capt. Richard Koll, left, and Airman 1st Class Mike Eulo perform function checks after launching an MQ-1 Predator unmanned aerial vehicle Aug. 7 at Balad Air Base, Iraq. Photo U.S. Air Force/Master Sgt. Steve Horton

There has been a brewing unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) battle for some time, it’s not just a “executive agency” fight, it’s for the heart and soul of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and it’s especially about force structure, in other words, how big is the slice of my pie? When Matt Drudge links to a story, expect wide readership.

Generally speaking, as an airpower advocate, I see and in some cases, sympathize with the Air Force position.  I do believe there are efficiencies to be gained as I wrote here about the need for Special Operations Command to tighten up it’s RDTE.  But the problem is that the Air Force has a bad reputation for walking away from missions or just allowing them to atrophy.  Probably the most celebrated is the demise of the SR-71.  I think the vast amount of observers were sure that there was some SR-72 or some other follow on out there but my reading of the situation is that when SAC died (or was murdered) the advocates within the Air Force were lost.  The feeling I assessed is the attitude “if I’m not using the intelligence Take, why should I pay for it?”

The list of areas where the Air Force has walked away from missions is startling.  Without even discussing counter-insurgency airpower, medium and light tactical airlift went away (from a robust fleet of Vietnam era C-7’s and C-123’s, later South American focused C-27’s and European C-23 Sherpas) tactical recce went away except for a small number of Air Guard F-16’s (a once proud fleet of RF-4C’s were boneyard bound after Desert Storm), and tactical electronic warfare was passed to the Navy with the demise of the EF-111 fleet (there remains some EC-130’s)

Ironically, the Navy (whether by design or necessity) took a different tack with the recently retired F-14 and first turning it from a pure interceptor to a Recce platform and in it’s twilight, created the Bombcat where it performed superbly in Afghanistan and even land based for Iraq (flying from Kuwait)  The single seat F-15 remains a fighter interceptor, admittedly a fine one, but with no corollary other role, although the Japanese are talking of turning into a recce platform ala F-14.  While the F-15C’s fly practice sorties and airshows, they wait till the next time a country takes us on in the air to air fight.

There was even a consolidation of VIP airlift in the 80’s when the services gave up their VIP transports for a single fleet of C-21 Learjets.  And what has happened lately, slowly but surely, the services and even combatant commanders have a VIP airlift fleet concerned that the ride won’t be there when called. (The USAF operates the theater aircraft, but not the services.) 

As the Air Force fights for this mission area, assets, and primacy, it would be well advised to try and understand the concern of the other services.  Viewed from a Joint or other service perspective, it’s a wonder that the United States Air Force isn’t renamed into the United States Air to Air Force.  I know this is harsh, but right now, the best thing for my parent service is a little tough love.