Photo above of the 6th SOS from awhile back (U.S. Air Force Photograph by Airman 1st Class Ali Flisek)
In these threads, via e-mails and phone calls, I have been criticized, quite justifiably so, as to putting the cart before the horse, that is coming up with a material solution (The AT-6 airplane) before any requirements have been established. I did that to stimulate the discussion.
I was at a convention a few years back and a Marine General who worked procurement issues was lamenting how long it took for the USMC to buy the air defense variant of the light armored vehicle, he groaned that it took well over ten years (and I’ve looked for the length and can’t find it) but he said it was way too long “to put a turret on a tank” or something to that effect. So when they needed some light vehicles to replace their tired M-151 gun jeeps, he and a couple of Colonels and Sgt Maj’s pulled out a copy of Jane’s, found some vehicles they thought could work, called the manufacturers to get quotes, and eventually bought the Mercedes Benz G-Wagon as the General said “I can’t wait 10 years to buy a jeep!”
I absolutely believe the AT-6 could work and should be bought. However, it is time to look at the totality of what exactly is the requirement to support our troops, defeat insurgencies, and help our Allies survive. Two recent Rand documents won’t help us much. Earlier this year, Rand published a monograph titled “Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era The Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory and Assistance Missions” these following quotes tell you all you need to know:
For these reasons, this monograph has emphasized the need for USAF to develop an expanded capacity to conduct aviation advising, assisting, training, and equipping missions.
Then in the “Final Thoughts” paragraph:
DoD and USAF face a great challenge in meeting these new demands and, at the same time, continuing necessary modernization to deter and defeat conventional threats. The argument that irregular warfare has completely supplanted conventional conflict is a gross oversimplification of reality. One need look no further than China to identify a nation whose economic might, ambitions, and rapid military modernization could pose a serious threat to U.S. interests in Asia. To prevail against China or other potential adversaries with advanced military capabilities, the United States must not neglect its own conventional modernization programs.
Well, there you have it. Hire some more aviation advisors but keep those conventional modernization programs going because the real threat is China.
And just this month, a new Rand monograph was published titled “Airlift Capabilities for Future U.S. Counterinsurgency Operations” The authors discuss the goodness the C-7 Caribou was in Vietnam for resupplying our Special Forces teams scattered in the hinterland and peripherally calls for some potential amorphous FID airplane support, but there are no recommendations for a renewed program for a low end airlifter, for STOL, for anything to support our SOF teams and other forces, who by the way, are in varied and scattered places in Iraq and Afghanistan ala Vietnam, but they do call for something…
Here are my key extracts from the conclusions:
The good news is that the current U.S. airlift fleet, organizations, and doctrines are suitable for performing the great majority of missions incumbent in counterinsurgency operations. Most airlift missions in support of counterinsurgencies are simple logistics missions movingpeople and things between established bases, often with appropriately developed airfields nearby….
The bad news is that the United States cannot go on handling the counterinsurgency airlift mission much longer as it is currently withoutsubstantial reinvestment and realignment of its airlift program… But that prospect also should spark creative studies and thinking about the issue of airlift in general, including quantitative analyses of futurecounterinsurgency airlift requirements in particular…. This study concludes, therefore, by going somewhat beyond its original charter to recommend that DoD and the military services infuse fresh energy, rigor, and vision into their ongoing effort to assess future airlift requirements….
And wait for it….wait for it, the final sentence and the money quote: The time for another foundational reappraisal of the national airlift program seems to be on the horizon.
Let me summarize: current airlift suitable…reinvestment of airlift program…assess requirements….reappraisal of program…HOORAY! More studies!!!
Folks our troops don’t need more studies, at least not like this, a study calling for more studies? This is why I cut to the chase and said, buy the AT-6 NOW! OK, having said this, let’s do what others seem unable to do. The good news is we have top cover in the form of two things, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force General Moseley gave a speech where he ponders transferring a squadron of A-10’s to AFSOC. In the speech he was quoted as saying: “I don’t know if I’m wedded to [the COIN unit] so much as I would like to know the pluses and minuses,” said Gen Moseley.
And AFSOC itself published a study we have on our AT-6 Project page titled “USAF Irregular Warfare Concept” by Colonel Billy Montgomery. THIS is actually a good document. Rather than cut to the answer as I have done, AFSOC has gone halfway between the requirement and rubber on the ramp, they outline their CONOP without leaping to the airframe types, although they throw out broad categories like light strike, light mobility, heavy mobility, rotary wing, ISR and the supporting elements. They outline a single wing of aircraft, some notional numbers of airframes, and recommend assigning them (logically) to AFSOC.
We already have some really good dialogue here and via e-mails to me by folks that in many cases have done this for real or at least are up to step on the subject so I am going to take this off the main topic area and start a new thread titled COIN Aircraft Requirements and put separate areas tentatively Strike, Light Mobility, ISR. Where this will get muddy is that AFSOC already has a Predator Squadron but perhaps that is not sufficient so we’ll just see where the conversation goes. Please keep looking and sniping at the AT-6 idea as I will prepare a final brief in about 45 days but we will have parallel and complimentary discussions.
ROE is simple: no classified information or sensitive or even hints of that, the posts will be pulled and brought to the immediate attention of the appropriate folks, let’s face it, NOTHING we are talking about here needs to be classified. Second, no company proprietary info but of course, as we stated before, we welcome company representatives to propose or discuss their products, just no sock puppetry. And of course, keep the discussion professional and no name calling or personal attacks. Once again, you can and are encouraged to tell me I am wrong, I really do seek contrary views and push back and this is all meant to be a collaboration or community project.
Well, for everyone on the Air Staff, EXCALIBUR’s working the problem….